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Kevin O'Rourke, O.P. 
The three authors are affiliated with the Center for Health Care Ethics at 
the St. Louis University Medical Center. 
Case Study: 
Paul Brophy, a 48-year old fireman living in Boston, married to Patricia Brophy for 27 
years, suffered a subarachnoid hemorrhage as a result of a ruptured basilar tip aneurysm on 
March 22, 1983. In order to correct the aneurysm, Brophy underwent major surgery 
involving a right frontotemporal craniotomy and a clipping of the basilar tip aneurysm. 
Postoperatively, he never regained consciousness, and has remained in a persistent 
vegetative state. Subsequent to his surgery of April 6, 1983 and prior to his discharge on 
June 28, 1983, Brophy received multiple CT scans, which showed a complete infarction 
(destruction of tissue secondary to lack of blood flow) of his left posterior cerebral artery 
and infarction of the righttemporallobe of the brain. In January,I985, Patricia Brophy, 
with the consent of the five Brophy children, all of whom are adults, petitioned to have all 
life sustaining treatment removed from her husband, including the discontinuation of all 
artificial nutrition and hydration. 
What decision should the court make? 
Divergent Opinions 
In March, 1986, Judge Kopelman of the Family Court, Norfolk 
Division, State of Massachusetts, after agreeing that "it is highly unlikely 
that Brophy will ever again regain cognitive ability ta purposefully interact 
with his environment" and after stating that "if he (Brophy) were presently 
competent he would choose to forego the provision of food and water," 
determined that the artificial feeding and hydration must be continued 
because 
it is ethically inappropriate to cause the preventable death of Brophy by the 
deliberate denial of food and water, which can be provided to him in a 
noninvasive, nonintrusive manner which causes him no pain and suffering, 
irrespective of the substituted judgment of the patient.! 
In September, 1986, the decision of Judge Kopelman was reversed, and 
the Supreme Court of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts allowed the 
removal of the gastrostomy tube, stating 
I) The State's interest in preservation of life includes the recognition that life is 
more than mere corporeal existence. The patient's humanity itself may be 
degraded by the processes designed to sustain existence. It is for the individual, 
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not the State, to decide the value of continued existence. That value may include 
an interest in maintaining bodily integrity and avoiding invasive and demeaning 
medical treatment. 
2) The State's interest in prevention of suicide is not implicated in Brophy's case. 
The affliction rendering Brophy incapable of swallowing, not the removal of the 
gastrostomy tube, will be responsible for his death. 
3) Refusing medical intervention merely allows the disease to take its natural 
course; if death were eventually to occur, it would be the result, primarily, of the 
underlying disease, and not the result of a self-inflicted injury'> 
The legal opinions expressed in court decisions do not determine ethical 
issues. Rather, legal decisions should be based upon ethical norms. But 
sometimes differing court decisions may be used to indicate a lack of 
ethical consensus concerning specific medical procedures. The diametrical-
ly opposed legal opinions in the Brophy case demonstrate the lack of 
ethical agreement in regard to use of artificial hydration and nutrition for 
patients in irreversible coma.3 
The lack of ethical agreement in .regard to treatment of patients in 
irreversible coma is also evidenced in statements from different 
professional organizations. For example, the American Medical 
Association (AMA) has declared: 
Even if death is not imminent but a patient's coma is beyond doubt irreversible 
and there are adequate safeguards to confirm the accuracy of the diagnosis and 
with the concurrence of those who have responsibility for the care of the patient, 
it is not unethical to discontinue all means of life prolonging medical treatment. 
Life prolonging medical treatment includes medication and artificially or 
technologically supplied respiration, nutrition or hydration 4 
On the other hand, a working group of the Pontifical Academy of 
Science, consultors to Pope John Paul II, after making a distinction 
between treatment (medical interventions) and care (ordinary help due to 
bedridden patients), said: 
, 
If the patient is in permanent coma, irreversible as far as it is possible to predict, 
treatment is not required but care including feeding must be provided.5 
While this article will not solve all questions in regard to the ethical and 
medical use of artificial hydration and nutrition, we wish to offer a few 
distinctions from the Catholic ethical tradition which may help to dispel 
some of the disagreement concerning the use artificial hydration and 
nutrition when a person is in an irreversible coma or persistent vegetative 
state. 
Imminent Death 
One confusing factor in determining ethical health care for seriously ill 
patients is phrases such as "imminent death" and "terminal condition". 
These phrases are often invoked as though they determine a patient's 
medical care. For example, in the cases of Karen Quinlan and Paul 
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Brophy, the lower courts, which refused permission to remove life support 
mechanisms, considered imminence of death an important issue. The 
courts and many physicians often use the terms "imminent death" and 
"terminal condition," to imply that a physician can predict that a patient 
will die of a fatal pathology within a few days or weeks in spite of the fact 
that life prolonging methods are already being utilized. Using these terms 
in this sense as significant factors in making ethical and legal decisions for 
seriously ill persons begs the question. The important issue is not how long 
the patient might live with life support systems, but whether a life support 
system should be initiated in the first place, or once intitiated , for what 
reasons it may be withdrawn. 
Aside from murder and suicide, death occurs from a pathology internal 
to the physiological system which so unbalances homeostasis that the 
patient cannot survive. Life-prolonging therapy seeks to remove a 
potentially fatal pathology, or it aims at circumventing or delaying the 
effect of the fatal pathology. Thus, a person undergoes surgery to remove 
cancer or a person agrees to kidney dialysis in order to circumvent renal 
failure. A person in an irreversible coma or in a persistent vegetative state, 
cannot chew and swallow. Proximately, this is due to malfunction of the 
swallowing mechanism; remotely, it is usually due to a dysfunction in the 
cerebral cortex. Thus a person in an irreversible coma or persistent 
vegetative state will die of a fatal pathology- the inability to swallow- in a 
short time, unless life-prolonging devices are utilized to circumvent the 
pathology 
Withholding artificial hydration and nutrition from a patient in this 
debilitated condition does not induce a new fatal pathology. Rather, it 
allows an already existing fatal pathology to take its natural course. In like 
manner, when a respirator is removed, the person usually dies because of 
malfunction in the cardiopulmonary system, which pathology had been 
circumvented by use of the respirator. From the ethical perspective, the 
intention of the persons removing the life support sy'stem is not to kill the 
patient, but rather to discontinue therapy which is ' not beneficial to the 
patient, or to remove a burden from the patient. The ensuing death is 
foreseen but not directly intended and the death is ethically allowable 
because of the condition of the patient. This distinction between inducing a 
fatal pathology and allowing a fatal pathology to take its natural course 
because circumventing it will not benefit the patient, is aptly expressed by 
the Supreme Court of Massachusetts in the Brophy case. 
Hence, when making ethical or legal decisions concerning the care of 
persons in irreversible coma or with other serious pathological conditions, 
rather than discussing whether death is imminent, or whether the patient is 
terminally ill, we should ask whether a fatal pathology is present. If a fatal 
pathology is present, the significant ethical question is not whether death is 
imminent, but rather whether there is a moral obligation to seek to remove 
fatal pathology or at least to circumvent its effects. Hence, when determining 
for oneself or for another whether to utilize life-prolonging therapy, the 
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most fundamental question becomes, "Is there an ethical obligation to seek 
to remove or circumvent the fatal pathology?" If not, the pathology may be 
allowed to take its normal course. 
Basis for Ethical Obligation 
How decide to treat a fatal pathology or let it take its natural course? One 
of the basic ethical assumptions upon which medicine and efforts to nurse 
and feed people are based is that life should be prolonged because living 
enables us to pursue the purpose of life. Thus, there is a strong assumption 
that there is an ethical obligation to prolong life. But does that obligation 
ever cease? Clearly, it would cease if prolonging life does not contribute to 
striving for the purpose of life. Hence, if efforts to prolong life are ineffective 
or useless insofar as pursuing the purpose of life is concerned, or if 
prolonging life results in a severe burden for the patient insofar as pursuing 
the purpose of life is concerned, then the ethical obligation to prolong life is 
no longer present. 
What is the "purpose of life?" People use many expressions to define this 
purpose, for example, "to be happy", "to love God and neighbor", "to relate 
to others". The Catholic view of the purpose of life in regard to decisions of 
health care was stated by Pope Pius XII in 1957. This statement is still 
accepted as accurate and complete for determining the ethical treatment of 
seriously ill patients. The Pope explained: 
Normally one is held to use only ordinary means, according to circumstances of 
persons, places, times and culture, that is to say, means that do not involve any 
grave burden for oneself or another. A more strict obligation would be too 
burdensome for most people and would render the attainment of the higher, more 
important good too difficult. Life, health, all temporal activities are in fact 
subordinated to spiritual ends." 
Thus, in traditional Catholic teaching, when making decisions in medical 
ethics about care for people with fatal pathologies, the spiritual goal of life is 
emphasized. In order to differentiate those means to health and life which 
are ethically mandatory from those which are optional, Ca\ holic teaching 
uses the terms "ordinary means" and "extraordinary means". "Ordinary 
means" to foster health or to prolong life, are those means which are 
mandatory because they offer hope of benefit to the patient and may be 
utilized without grave burden to the patient. "Extraordinary means" to 
foster health and prolong life are on the other hand, those means which are 
optional either because they are ineffective insofar as benefit to the patient is 
concerned, or because they involve a grave burden.? But the foregoing 
definitions are incomplete unless we explain the terms "benefit to the 
patient" and "grave burden to the patient" in relation to the purpose oflife. 
Thus, a more adequate and complete explanation of "ordinary means" to 
prolong life is: Those means which are beneficial because they enable a 
person to strive for the spiritual purpose of life. A more adequate and 
complete explanation of "extraordinary means" to prolong life is: Those 
means that are optional because they do not enable a person to strive for the 
spiritual purpose of life or because they involve a grave burden insofar 
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as stnvmg for the purpose of life is concerned. While it may seem 
redundant, it is important to insist that one cannot judge what is beneficial 
for a person, or what is a grave burden in regard to the spiritual purpose of 
life unless one knows the condition of the individual patient-not only the 
physiological condition, but the social and spiritual condition as well. 
Thus, Pope Pius XII stated that, when decisions are made concerning 
medical care, "circumstances of person, places, times and culture must be 
considered. " 
The terms "ordinary and extraordinary means" have become 
commonplace outside the Catholic community in legal, medical and 
ethical statements regarding the obligation to utilize specific life-
prolonging medical therapy. But too often, when using the terms 
"ordinary or extraordinary means" to prolong life, ethicists, judges or 
physicians fail to stipulate that the criteria to evaluate life-prolonging 
medical therapy is the spiritual purpose of life, not the preservation of 
mere physiological function. Moreover, they often use the terms ordinary 
and extraordinary means as abstract, and a priori designations with no 
reference to circumstances of persons, places, times and culture. Thus, to 
state "artificial nutrition is an ordinary means to prolong life," without 
reference to the patient's medical condition, is meaningless. Or to state that 
"ordinary means of preserving life are means which can effectively 
preserve life, without imposing grave burden on the patient" is an 
incomplete statement.8 What does it mean "to effectively preserve life"? If 
the mere physiological function of a person is preserved, as is the case of 
those in irreversible coma, does that enable the person to strive for the 
spiritual ends of life? As we shall see, mere physiological function does not 
enable a person to strive for the spiritual purpose of life. Hence, it seems 
that some of the confusion attributed to the terms "ordinary and 
extraordinary means" to prolong life, arises because people are not specific 
enough about the circumstances and goal of life, and hence not specific 
enough about the goal of medical care. 9 
Ineffective Therapy 
In order to pursue the spiritual purpose of life, one needs a minimal 
degree of cognitive-affective function. Hence, if medical efforts to restore 
cognitive-affective function in an adult can be judged ineffective or if it can 
be judged that an infant will never develop cognitive-affective function , 
and if a fatal pathology is present, then the adult or infant may be allowed 
to die. There is no need to seek to remove the fatal pathology or circumvent 
its effects if the efforts would not enable the individual to achieve 
cognitive-affective function and thus strive for the spiritual purpose of life . 
This is the precise Catholic ethical justification for discontinuing artificial 
hydration and nutrition for people in irreversibie coma, not the fact "that 
benefits or treatment outweigh its burdens," as the AMA statement 
indicates.1O Physiological function which can be prolonged long after 
cognitive-affective function ceases irreparably, is not a sufficient reason 
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for prolonging life. Physiological function without the potential for 
cognitive-affective function does not benefit the patient and does not 
contribute to pursuing the purpose of life. The primary role of 
physiological function is to support cognitive-affective function, but we 
know physiological activity can continue long after cognitive-affective 
function is irreparably lost because of brain damage. Some physicians and 
ethicians maintain that the diagnosis of irreversible coma or persistent 
vegetative state are never "absolutely certain". They cite cases of people 
who have recovered consciousness after an "irreversible coma", and imply 
that it is never safe to make a medical judgement that therapy is ineffective 
for a person in a persistent vegetative state or an irreversible coma. 
Remembering that all valid medical decisions are based on 
physiological evidence, it is well to recall that a diagnosis of irreversible 
coma or persistent vegetative state utilizes diagnostic studies of brain 
damage as well as observed lack of cognitive-affective and physiological 
function over a prolonged period of time. ll While this careful diagnosis 
will not rule out with absolute certainty the possibility for "recovery," it 
does afford sufficient evidence for safe medical diagnosis and prognosis. 
Only two cases in medical literature report patients who regained cognitive 
awareness after a verified diagnosis of irreversible coma. l2 This posits an 
accurate diagnosis in about 99.98% of the cases. Medical decisions do not 
admit of greater certitude given that medicine is an art as well as a science. 
If physicians waited until absolute certitude could be achieved, they would 
never act. Moreover, we must bear in mind that "recovery" from an 
irreversible coma does not imply that the person recovers full cognitive-
affective function or physical mobility. In fact, the state ofthe persons who 
"recovered" from irreversible coma was severely impaired-so impaired 
that the condition of the person might be considered a grave burden 
insofar as striving for the spiritual purpose of life is concerned. 13 
Still a Human Being 
, 
Is the person who has physiological function but no hope of recovering 
cognitive-affective function still a human being? Yes, but there is no ethical 
obligation to strive to prolong the life of that human being. There is an 
ethical obligation to keep the person comfortable and we will have another 
word to say about comfort care. (See section to come herein.) But the usual 
ethical obligation to seek to prolong the life of another person, when a fatal 
pathology is present, ceases, once it can be determined that the person will 
not recover, or does not have the potential for developing cognitive-
affective function . Notice that the physical pain, or lack of it, associated 
with the life-prolonging therapy, is not in itself the sole determining factor 
when making an ethical decision whether therapy is effective or ineffective 
in regard to restoring cognitive-affective function. For this reason, Justice 
Kopelman's decision in the circuit court in the Brophy case was flawed , 
because life-prolonging therapy may be withdrawn as soon as it is obvious 
that it is ineffective insofar as restoring cognitive-affective function is 
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concerned, as the Supreme Court of Massachusetts indicated when it 
reversed Justice Kopelman's decision. The degree of physical pain may 
influence the ethical judgment concerning the burden that prolonging life 
entails, but not the judgment concerning the effectiveness or ineffectiveness 
of life-prolonging therapy. 
A Grave Burden 
Whether prolonging life will result in a grave burden for the patient, 
insofar as striving for the spiritual purpose of life is concerned, is a more 
difficult ethical judgment. But simply because it is difficult does not mean 
it is to be avoided or supplanted by a law which eliminates consideration of 
some meaningful circumstances. If the person with a fatal pathology is 
competent, then he or she should be allowed to make the decision whether 
or not prolonging life would be a grave burden in regard to pursuing the 
purpose of life. The seriously ill person is not "autonomous" in the 
absolute sense, as some ethicists would indicate. Hence, the decision about 
prolonging life should take personal, familial, and social circumstances 
into account, because one has responsibility to self, family and society 
insofar as fulfilling the spiritual purpose of life is concerned. For example, 
a father whose life is threatened because of cancer, may decide that his 
purpose in life would be better fulfilled if he rejected chemotherapy, 
surgery, or hospitalization in order to devote his time to his family during 
his remaining days, and to devote his savings toward the education of his 
children. Given the circumstances, the father is not "choosing death." 
Rather, realizing that he must die sometime, he chooses to provide for his 
family as well as he can, rather than choosing to prolong his life for two, 
three, or even 10 years and, as a result, endangering other values, such as 
meaningful time with loved ones or the education of his children. 
Choosing in this manner is not suicide; the father foresees that death may 
occur sooner than if he entered a program of therapy, but his direct 
intention is to benefit his family . His earlier death w<1uld be a necessary, 
but undesired , side effect on his choice. 
When making the ethical decision about grave burden, one seeks to 
assess the spiritual burden that would result iflife is prolonged, not simply 
the physical burden which utilizing the life-prolonging therapy would 
entail. This distinction seems to be misunderstood by many ethicists, 
physicians and judges. Hence, when faced with the decision of whether or 
not to prolong the life of another person some consider the amount of 
physical pain as the only significant factor; the psychic pain and anguish 
associated with living in a severely debilitated condition are often 
overlooked. But whatever the source of pain, it is the relationship of the 
pain to pursuing the purpose of life that matters. This judgment may differ 
from person to person. Thus, severe pain or great expense, causing the loss 
of other more important values, may result in a decision by one person that 
he would have a very difficult time striving for the purpose of life. On the 
other hand, another person, faced with the same pain or expense, may 
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determine that for him, a grave burden would not result insofar as striving 
for the purpose of life is concerned. Recall that decisions in regard to 
prolonging life are to be made "in accord with circumstances of person, 
places, times and culture." Thus, a person with a fatal pathology has many 
other factors besides his or her physiological condition to consider before 
making a decision about fitting therapy. 
Proxy Decisions 
Even more difficult ethical decisions are involved when a decision based 
upon grave burden must be made for another person who is incompetent 
of deprived mental abilities . If the person for whom the proxy decision 
must be expressed, when still competent, stated how he or she wished to be 
treated after losing competency, then those wishes should be followed out 
of respect for the person. But sometimes proxy decisions must be made 
with no information about the presumed desires of the incompetent 
person. In these cases, decisions are made by asking "What would any 
reasonable person desire, given the circumstances?" For example, if the life 
of an infant with a fatal pathology could be prolonged with some hope that 
the infant would develop cognitive-affective function, but if prolonging life 
would involve great pain, or expense, or inhuman living conditions, would 
a reasonable person attempt to remove the pathology or arrest its effects? 
Ethically speaking, if a fatal pathology is present, need a family consent to 
life-prolonging therapy for an infant who has severe genetic disease such as 
Lesch-Nyhan Syndrome or who will require nursing care 24 hours a day 
for the rest of his or her life? Should all children born with severe 
complicated immunological deficiency (SCID) be raised in plastic 
bubbles, as was Baby David in Houston? In the case of Baby David, the 
means to prolong life were not painful but after a time, the life of Baby 
David became severely burdensome and, at age 13, he requested to have 
the bubble removed. Again, the proxy is called upon to assess the burden 
resulting from prolonged life, not the physical burden mtrinsic to the 
means to prolong life . Even though the means to prolong life may be 
judged inexpensive or painless, using them may subject another human 
being to a life that is severely burdensome. 
When making decisions for others, the proxy must realize that a person 
with painful and impaired physiological function, even if his / her 
cognitive-affective function is weak, can still pursue the spiritual purpose 
of life. Thus, simply because an infant or an incompetent adult is 
debilitated or retarded does not imply automatically that he or she can be 
allowed to die from an existing fatal pathology. Moreover, a fatal 
pathology should never be induced in debilitated infants. But on the other 
hand, the notion that there is an ethical obligation to prolong the life of 
every infant or incompetent adult with a fatal pathology, simply because 
prolonging life is possible, is not ethically justifiable. Prolonging life may 
result in a grave burden for the infant or adult, insofar as pursuing the 
purpose of life is concerned. Hence, when determining whether to seek to 
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remove or circumvent a fatal pathology in a newborn infant or for an adult 
who is not competent, personal, familial and social factors must be taken 
into account, as they are when one makes a decision for oneself. 
Comfort Care Distinction in Papal Document 
Maintaining that the life of a person need not be prolonged when a fatal 
pathology is present does not imply that the person should be neglected. 
Every dying person should be given spiritual and physical care. The ethical 
obligation to keep dying patients comfortable leads some to demand 
artificial hydration and nutrition for all patients, even those who are in 
irreversible coma. 14 But is there any medical indication that persons in this 
condition feel physical pain? The neurological experts consulted in the 
Brophy case did not think so. In hospices and infirmaries of religious 
sisters, (the latter institutions being the embodiment of compassionate 
care for the dying), artificial hydration and nutrition are seldom utilized 
once a dying patient lapses into a coma. In sum, evidence seems to be 
lacking that removing or withholding tube feeding from individuals in 
deep coma or persistent vegetative state results in great pain for the 
patient. 
Conclusion 
The Brophy case and the decisions of the courts in Massachusetts 
illustrate the divergence of ethical opinion in regard to tube feeding and 
hydration. However, though there is disparity and disagreement, it seems 
that some agreement may be reached in this matter if the distinctions of 
Catholic tradition are utilized . The significant ethical question in 
preserving our own life or the life of another person is: "Is there an ethical 
obligation to prolong life?", not, "are we able to prolong life?" Moreover, 
all decisions about prolonging life should be made in view of the spiritual 
purpose of life and in view of the significant circumstances. Mere 
physiological function does not achieve the purpose pf human life. While 
inducing the pathology that causes death in an innocent person is never 
ethical, allowing a fatal pathology to take its normal course, not seeking to 
remove it nor circumvent its effects, in some circumstances is an ethically 
acceptable choice. 
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